North Korea's continued pursuit of a definitive nuclear threat adds weight to the mounting evidence that deterrence as a strategy is coming to the end of its lifetime. The logic for North Korea's actions is the same as that supporting the deployment of submarines carrying nuclear weapons by the US and others. It renders the concept of a first-strike, removing another state's ability to respond in kind, obsolete. This same argument is being used right now by proponents of the UK's Trident missile program, which is under review for modernization.
Members of the North Korean leadership state that their goal is security, adopting the time-honored strategy of mutually assured destruction. However, North Korea is not your typical state. Not only does its heavy-handed diplomacy rely almost entirely on the active threat of nuclear weapons, internal instability is a serious concern. The possibilities for what would happen in the event of sudden regime-change are varied and unpredictable. The fact is that intelligence communities around the world have proven poor at predicting its onset, and it would be both unreasonable and unwise to expect them to improve.
An article, by Sungtae Jacky Park, outlines several of the most likely and disturbing scenarios, including a nuclear take on murder-suicide and confusion enough at the executive level to motivate a preemptive strike. The latter, in particular, is not improbable. Failed communication between states is one of the fundamental explanations for war, and was the culprit in several, now historic, close-calls between the US and the Soviet Union. The most direct solution is to prevent approaching this precipice, where a single misstep invites disaster.
The future presented here is several steps removed from where we are at the moment. While North Korea is a nuclear state, it has not yet demonstrated the capacity to deliver a nuclear warhead to the mainland US. Until it does, the window is open to implement a more proactive strategy geared towards preventing what appears to be an eventuality. As it stands, the track record for deterrence shows progress for the North Korean nuclear program. Continued tests build on previous successes, and with each learning experience its goals become more attainable. Whether sooner or later, a definitive nuclear threat will emerge.
Now is the time for a change of strategy. What exactly that means is less certain. North Korea presents a conundrum, both regionally and internationally. Its opposition to the US, and specifically South Korea, has been a political bargaining chip for powers like China, while calculated demonstrations of its nuclear program have been met with conciliatory measures from the international community. While this is a strategic misstep on the part of the international community, and the US in particular, the incentive and end result has been short-term stability, solely focused on mitigating fears of North Korea's use of nuclear weapons.
Two aspects of this, in particular, are worrying from a strategic standpoint. The first is the decreasing reliance of the North Korean millennial generation on the Kim regime, and the second is the growing distance between China and the new North Korean leadership. Both are telling signs of the waning strength of the Kim regime. A population primed for change and a reluctant ally to the north should pose significant challenges for the fledgling ruler, Kim Jong-un. While from a political standpoint, the West may laud the fall of another authoritarian dictator, its strategy to this point has supported the regime's survival in favor of stability. How do we balance the competing goals of nurturing democracy and preventing an environment that may increase the probability of nuclear war?
We can see these issues coming. They present only a few of the obvious problems with deterrence, all of which contribute to making the present model unsustainable. Waiting will only increase the fall out, and make the results more costly for the international community. Though organic change is always preferable, how natural is the process of propping up an authoritarian regime? It is time to question every principle of our strategy while we still have the opportunity to prevent North Korea achieving its nuclear aims.
